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HIGH-LEVEL, “TENURED” LAWYERS
THOMAS W. MERRILL*
I
INTRODUCTION
Government lawyers can be broadly categorized as either political or civil
service appointees. The political appointees constitute a thin layer at or near
the top of the hierarchy of government lawyers. They include, most prominently, presidential appointees—“Officers of the United States” who must be
1
nominated and confirmed by the Senate prior to their appointment. They also
include a variety of lesser lawyers who are exempt from most of the civil service
2
laws. Such exempt “inferior Officers” include, for example, the lawyers in the
White House Counsel’s office and so-called “Schedule C” lawyers who hold
positions “of a confidential or policy-determining nature” scattered throughout
3
the bureaucracy.
The civil service lawyers form the much larger base of the hierarchy below
the thin top layer. They shall be referred to here as “tenured lawyers,” because, as in the case of tenured academics, they have an expectation of continued government employment unless and until they are terminated for cause
4
following cumbersome due process formalities. These tenure rights, which are
5
created by the civil service laws and regulations, do not confer the right to continue in any particular job or function. Tenured lawyers can be removed from
6
their position if their agency is abolished or is subject to a reduction in force.
Generally speaking, however, they cannot be fired, demoted, or have their pay
7
reduced unless they have been proven guilty of some dereliction of duty.
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1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
2. See 5 C.F.R. § 213.3301 (1998).
3. Id.
4. In fact, the leading due process authorities include cases spawned by adverse employment action taken against both civil service employees and teachers working for public institutions of higher
learning. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (academic employee); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (same); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (civil service employee).
5. See Arnett, 416 U.S. at 140-46.
6. In which case they have certain priority rights to employment elsewhere in the government.
See 5 C.F.R. § 359.601 (1998).
7. See generally ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 122-23 (2d ed. 1993)
(summarizing procedures).
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Although most tenured lawyers perform tasks that would be regarded as
routine from the perspective of high political theory, at the upper echelons of
the civil service, there are a significant number of lawyers—members of what is
called the Senior Executive Service—who hold positions of significant responsibility. In the Justice Department, for example, there is a “mixing zone” of
lawyers at the bottom of the thin political layer and the top of the civil service
base—roughly speaking, the layer consisting of deputies to presidential appointees—where some lawyers are political appointees and some are civil servants, and each performs comparable functions.
One example of such a mixing zone is provided by the office in the Justice
Department with which I am the most familiar, that of the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General’s office represents the United States before the Supreme
Court and supervises appellate litigation in the lower courts. The office is
headed by the Solicitor General, who is a presidential appointee and is the
fourth-highest ranking officer in the Justice Department. Immediately below
the Solicitor General are four Deputy Solicitors General. One, the Deputy Solicitor General and Counselor to the Solicitor General, informally known as the
“Political Deputy,” is a non-career member of the Senior Executive Service.
The other three deputies all hold what are called career-reserved positions in
8
the Senior Executive Service, that is, they are tenured civil servants. Although
the Political Deputy becomes Acting Solicitor General when the Solicitor General resigns or is disqualified, when both the Solicitor General and the Political
Deputy have resigned or are disqualified, which happens not infrequently, especially during the transition between administrations, one of the tenured
9
deputies becomes the Acting Solicitor General. For most day-to-day purposes,
such as arguing cases in the Supreme Court and approving the content of the
briefs filed in the Court, the Political Deputy and the tenured deputies perform
indistinguishable tasks and have the same degree of responsibility.
The functional justification for using civil service lawyers to perform such
high-level tasks has received very little scholarly attention. A better understanding of the rationale for having such lawyers is sorely needed, because civil
service lawyers are often the target of criticism. As James Q. Wilson has noted,
10
“[n]o politician ever lost votes by denouncing the bureaucracy,” and the impulse to poor-mouth the bureaucracy often carries over to include lawyer-

8. On the distinction between non-career and career-reserved Senior Executive Service (“SES”)
appointments, see 5 U.S.C. § 3134 (1994); 5 C.F.R. § 214.410 (1998). By law, no more than 10% of
SES positions can be filled by political appointees.
9. For example, in the transition period between the Reagan and the Bush Administrations, a
tenured Deputy, William Bryson, served as Acting Solicitor General for almost half a year. Among
the sensitive tasks he discharged during this period of time included the filing of the government’s brief
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), which asked the Court to overrule its
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Bryson served again as Acting Solicitor General in the
transition between the Bush and Clinton Administrations. He is now a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
10. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
DO IT 235 (1989).
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bureaucrats. Generally speaking, two types of criticism have been made, both
having some force.
The first is based on the lack of accountability of high-level tenured lawyers.
Presidential elections occur at four-year intervals, and, as we know, they often
result in a change of party control of the White House. When this happens,
new presidential appointees are installed in the departments and agencies, and
there is often a discernible shift in the direction of policy. Presidential appointees can usually count on political lawyers to carry out these new policies. But
high-level tenured lawyers are often regarded with suspicion. Because they
have tenure, they cannot be removed as a consequence of the result of the elections, even if they are suspected of hostility toward the policies of the incoming
administration. High-level tenured lawyers thus can pose an impediment to
democratic change.
The second criticism is based on the inefficiencies associated with any sys12
tem of tenure. It is extremely difficult to remove tenured civil servants from
13
office. Their security, combined with relatively little room for significant pay
14
differentials or bonuses based on performance, eliminates much of the incentive for high productivity. Thus, as will be familiar to anyone who has participated in debates over academic tenure, one considerable cost of any such system is that tenured employees may behave opportunistically by shirking or
performing only the minimal amount of work necessary to avoid dismissal or
demotion. Granting tenure to high-level lawyers may therefore impair the
general efficiency of the workforce.
The often unstated conclusion drawn from these criticisms is that we should
expand the use of political lawyers in performing high-level tasks and either
eliminate tenure for lawyers or push the use of tenured lawyers further down
15
the legal hierarchy. However, this conclusion presupposes that there are no
significant countervailing reasons for having high-level tenured lawyers. In this
essay, I will seek to identify and evaluate the most plausible justifications for
using tenured lawyers to perform high-level tasks within the executive branch
11. See generally RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY 1-10 (1994) (summarizing the accountability and productivity critiques of bureaucracies).
12. For a general discussion of the efficiency arguments for and against employment tenure, see
Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38
EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989).
13. It has been reported that [d]uring fiscal year 1990, of well more than a million and a half covered federal employees, only 370 were removed and 128 were demoted for poor performance.
O’NEIL, supra note 7, at 122. This means that 99.97% of covered civil servants sailed through the year
with no adverse employment action against them.
14. See JOHNSON & LIBECAP, supra note 11, at 170.
15. I am here concerned primarily with the use of tenured lawyers in high-level positions that entail the exercise of a significant measure of discretionary authority. With respect to lower-level civil
servants, the accountability critique carries less force, but the efficiency concern may loom large. Indeed, it is possible that the efficiency concerns warrant significant modifications of the tenure system
for lower-level employees. See id. at 170-71. After all, universities do not grant full tenure rights to
administrative personnel and maintenance workers, presumably because the efficiency costs would be
too high.
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legal system. Uncovering such justifications does not, of course, dispose of the
question of whether or to what extent we should deploy tenured lawyers to perform high-level roles. The accountability and inefficiency critiques must be
given their due before reaching any final evaluation of how best to structure the
government. Before we jump on the bandwagon in support of a return to the
patronage system, however, it is important to try to develop the best case for
preserving a significant role for upper-level civil service lawyers.
In Part II, I consider the traditional functional justification for the civil
service, which I will call the impartiality argument. This justification posits that
tenured employees are preferred to political or patronage employees because
they will discharge their duties free of favoritism or partisan bias. Without
suggesting that this justification is wholly meritless, I will argue that in our postLegal Realist Age it is not a very powerful one as applied to high-level tenured
lawyers. At the upper reaches of the legal hierarchy, one person’s political bias
is another person’s democratically sanctioned policy change. The idea that
tenured lawyers are more impartial in their discernment of the requirements of
the law therefore provides a rationale that is probably too weak to overcome
the accountability and efficiency concerns created by any system of tenure.
In Part III, I turn to a different rationale for tenure systems, one based on
the tendency of a such systems to encourage employees to adopt a long-term
perspective about the needs of the institution they serve. Tenured lawyers tend
to be repeat players rather than short termers, and as such they have an incentive to build and preserve the institutional capital of the Executive Branch. Because of their efforts in building this institutional capital, the Executive Branch
is arguably a stronger and more effective instrument for realizing the goals of
each successive administration than would be the case if every newly elected
President had to assemble a cadre of lawyers from scratch as under the patronage system. I consider this rationale a more powerful justification for using
tenured lawyers in certain high-level positions, one sufficiently important to
warrant some compromise with the accountability and efficiency arguments favoring the use of at-will employees.
In Part IV, I briefly consider how the institutional capital justification for
tenured lawyers might fit into the on-going debate over how best to conduct investigations into alleged criminal wrongdoing by high-level executive branch
officials—the problem of Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair, the Whitewater investigation, and now the Monica Lewinsky scandal. The current solution to this
problem embodied in the Ethics in Government Act—the appointment of an
“Independent Counsel” by an Article III tribunal—has probably given rise to
more difficulties than the problem it is designed to solve. The source of these
difficulties is that Independent Counsels combine the worst features of tenured
lawyers and political lawyers. Like tenured lawyers, they lack political accountability and are prone to inefficiency. Like political lawyers, however, they
also lack the long-term perspective that repeat players enjoy. I suggest that a
superior solution to the problem of criminal investigations of high government
officials would be to have such investigations conducted by tenured lawyers
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within the Justice Department who are at least indirectly accountable to
elected officials.
II
THE IMPARTIALITY JUSTIFICATION
The most familiar rationale that has been advanced for the civil service is
what I will call the impartiality justification: Tenured employees are more
likely to discharge their duties without having their judgment influenced by
political or partisan considerations. This is the reason most commonly cited in
support of the abolition of the Jacksonian spoils system and the creation of the
16
civil service in the Pendleton Act of 1883. The ideal of administrative impartiality probably reached its apogee with the “scientific management” school of
17
18
government associated with Woodrow Wilson and Herbert Hoover, and carried over into the celebration of administrative “expertise” that was a promi19
nent aspect of the New Deal. It remains today the officially recognized ra20
tionale for giving government employees tenure protection.
In many areas of public administration, the ideal of impartiality continues
to hold sway. Most people would probably agree that new drug applications,
motor vehicle safety standards, DNA testing standards, and changes in the
money supply should be determined with at least significant input from persons
chosen for their objectivity and technical expertise rather than their political
views. Indeed, Justice Stephen Breyer has recently written an influential book
arguing for the creation of a super-agency of insulated experts to establish na21
tional priorities for the regulation of environmental risks. So impartiality as
an ideal for government employees is far from dead.
Underlying the impartiality ideal is the distinction between political and
nonpolitical decisionmaking. According to the scientific management conception, politics has its proper role in setting the basic direction of policy. But
once the policy is fixed, the details of implementation and application of that
policy should be determined by impartial experts. Thus, in order to foster and
protect the ideal of objective implementation of policy, we have created the
civil service system.
Whatever its status in fields that intersect with scientific and technological
expertise, the impartiality ideal is under considerable stress as applied to high-

16. See generally ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT 1965-1883 (1968); JOHNSON & LIBECAP, supra note 11, at 12-41.
17. See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887).
18. Hoover’s endorsement of scientific management was most pronounced in his roles as administrator and chair of various commissions devoted to administrative reform. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THE
TIDES OF REFORM 21-25 (1997).
19. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24 (1938).
20. See 5 C.F.R. § 214.402(b)(2) (1998) (noting that positions in the SES must be reserved for career appointees when necessary “to ensure impartiality, or the public’s confidence in the impartiality,
of the Government”).
21. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993).

MERRILL.FMT

88

12/31/98 12:12 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 61: No. 2

22

level government lawyers. In the legal context, the impartiality vision presupposes some form of “legal right-answerism.” That is, one must believe that
there is an activity called “politics” that consists of making or creating new
rules, and that there is a distinctive activity called “law” that consists of discovering or identifying preexisting rules, and one must further believe that objective and appropriately trained lawyers can agree in most instances on the right
answer to the question “what is the law with respect to x?” One implication of
this perspective is that those engaged in rule creation should be politically accountable: Preferably they should be elected officials (members of Congress or
the President and Vice President), but at the very least they should be answerable to such elected officials. In contrast, those engaged in discovering or identifying existing rules should be insulated from political influences in order to
keep their vision clear of extraneous factors clouding their ability to see the
right answer.
This strong distinction between politics and law is a staple of our legal cul23
ture and its influence is not hard to find. Yet there is reason to think that its
influence is on the wane. We live in a post-Legal Realist Age, when most legal
commentators take it for granted that law cannot be disentangled from politics
24
and that legal judgment is driven by the political beliefs of the decisionmaker.
This disparagement of the politics/law distinction is most prominently associated with (or at least acknowledged in) the work of critical and post-modern
scholars, but it is by no means confined to them. It is also one of the lessons of
recent struggles over the confirmation of judges. The struggles started with the
Bork confirmation hearings, where the nominee sought to cast himself as an
anti-Realist who would always enforce the law according to its “original in25
tent.” A majority of the Senate and virtually the entire Democratic establishment scoffed at this profession of faith, and succeeded in portraying Bork’s
commitment to law as a cover for a conservative political agenda. Not to be
outdone, the Republicans, once they took control of the Senate after 1994, have
sought to portray Clinton’s judicial nominees as activists bent on transforming

22. When I refer to government lawyers, I am speaking only of those employees who perform
roles as legal advocates for and advisors to various government agencies. Insofar as legally trained
employees serve in a decisionmaking capacity within government agencies, the impartiality ideal arguably takes on greater significance. The clearest example would be the cadre of government lawyers
known as Administrative Law Judges. Extensive measures are taken to assure the independence of
ALJs from political control and oversight, see, for example 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (1994) (prohibiting ex
parte communications), in order to promote the sense they are impartial and hence worthy of being
regarded as “judge-like.” I do not consider in this paper the arguably distinct rationale for assuring the
impartiality of these lawyers.
23. It is, for example, the vision that underlies the famous Chevron decision in administrative law.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). There, the
political function is identified as belonging to elected politicians and their political appointees, while
the rule discovering function is identified as belonging to the Article III judiciary. See Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1088-91 (1997).
24. I do not number myself among the extreme skeptics about the possibility of legal knowledge,
at least in most instances. But that is a subject for another day.
25. For the apologia, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
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the law to suit their own liberal ideological commitments. We have now
reached the point where few elected politicians believe that a lawyer who is a
member of the opposing political party can distinguish between politics and
law.
The spread of Legal Realist ideas leads to a conception of the role of the
government lawyer that devalues impartiality. Again, we do not have to scour
the literature of the left to find support for this proposition. It is fully revealed
in an essay by Geoff Miller, a conservative law and economics scholar, about
whether it is ethically proper for tenured government lawyers to adopt a view
of the law’s requirements at odds with the policy preferences of their politically
27
accountable superiors. Miller argues that this kind of independent judgment
is improper:
Although the public interest as a reified concept may not be ascertainable, the Constitution establishes procedures for approximating that ideal through election, appointment, confirmation, and legislation. Nothing systematic empowers government lawyers to substitute their individual conceptions of the good
for the priorities and
28
objectives established through these governmental processes.

Implicit in Miller’s account is the same proposition endorsed by the left:
that “law” does not exist separate and distinct from politics. To the contrary,
judgments about law are ultimately political judgments. Because our Constitution establishes a framework of elections, legislation, and administration by officers accountable to the President for establishing political judgments, the
proper role of the government lawyer is faithfully to carry out the political instructions received from superiors, not to interpose objections based on the
lawyer’s reading of the requirements of “the law.”
This theoretical critique of government lawyers exercising independent
judgment about the requirements of the law has been extended to the Solicitor
29
General’s office by John McGinnis, another conservative scholar. McGinnis
argues that the President is entitled to his own understanding of the meaning of
the Constitution, and that the Solicitor General, as a subordinate officer to the
President, should function as a “paladin who attempts to impress the Presi30
dent’s undiluted constitutional vision upon the Court.” Prudential concerns
about winning cases and maintaining good will among the constitutional
branches, according to McGinnis, should take a back seat to advocacy of the
President’s constitutional vision.
Not surprisingly, McGinnis views the tenured lawyers in the Solictor General’s Office as an impediment to reorienting the Office in this fashion. He ex26. See Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target ‘Judicial Activism’; Conservatives Block Nominees;
Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at A1; Linda Greenhouse, Why
Bork is Still a Verb in Politics, 10 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, § 4 at 3.
27. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987).
28. Id. at 1295.
29. See John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992).
30. Id. at 807.
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plains the recalcitrance of these lawyers in terms of theories of bureaucratic
behavior. The tenured lawyers in the Solicitor General’s Office, by professing
fidelity to Supreme Court precedents—which they claim a unique capacity to
interpret—are aggrandizing their own power and influence within the bureauc31
racy. Although McGinnis does not suggest that all tenured lawyers in the So32
licitor General’s Office be fired and replaced with political appointees, he
does recommend that new civil service hires be screened for their
“jurisprudential views,” noting that “[t]he President’s jurisprudence would be
advanced more readily by a staff whose inclinations and methodology are
33
closely aligned with the President’s philosophy.” Thus, McGinnis, like Miller,
sees no role for the exercise of autonomous legal judgment by civil service lawyers.
The loss of faith in impartiality as an ideal of government lawyering is not
confined to theory; it has also been extended to practice. Presidents appear increasingly to share the view that all administration of the law is political.
Starting with President Nixon, if not before, the ratio of political appointees to
34
tenured appointees has steadily increased. The rationale for this increasing
penetration of political appointees has been to assure “control” of the administrative process by the President. Specifically, tenured lawyers are assumed to
make decisions based on political criteria, and are further assumed to harbor
the political values of the outgoing administration (or of the Congress, if it is
controlled by the other political party). To counteract this perceived threat of
“sabotage” by civil service lawyers, larger and larger numbers of political lawyers are being added to the administrative structure.
This process of increased political oversight is vividly illustrated by the fa35
mous Bob Jones University case that arose in the early years of the Reagan
presidency. Bob Jones was a fundamentalist Christian university that followed
certain racially discriminatory practices. When the IRS, enforcing a policy imposed on it by the courts and having scant textual basis, revoked the school’s
tax exempt status, the school sought review of the policy by the Supreme Court.
The Solicitor General, Rex Lee, disqualified himself from participating in the

31. See id. at 810-11. Other commentators have observed that the independence of the Solicitor
General’s office is related to the fact that “the bulk of the Solicitor General’s staff consists of civil
service employees who are not subject to removal for political or ideological reasons.” Richard G.
Wilkins, An Officer and An Advocate: The Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1167,
1170 (1988). The traditional view, of course, regarded such independence as a good thing.
32. He notes that it would violate the civil service laws to dismiss incumbent lawyers “for their jurisprudential views.” McGinnis, supra note 29, at 812 n.70.
33. Id. at 812.
34. See James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The DemocracyBureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, in THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY, 144-45 (Richard J. Stillman III
& Frederick C. Mosher eds., 1989).
35. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). For an account of the internal
politics in the Justice Department regarding the case and the role of Acting Solicitor General Wallace,
see LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 5164 (1987).
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case. Acting in his place was Lawrence Wallace, senior Deputy Solicitor Gen36
eral and the quintessential tenured civil service lawyer.
At the certiorari stage, Wallace argued that the IRS’s policy was correct.
However, after review was granted and certain members of Congress criticized
the IRS’s position, a group of political appointees in the Justice Department
known as the “Bob Jones team” launched an effort to get the Department to
change its position. Attorney General Smith eventually sided with this group
and ordered Wallace to file a brief supporting the university. Wallace did so,
but only after including a footnote describing the brief as stating the “position
37
of the United States” but not that of “the Acting Solicitor General.” Wallace
thus publicly signaled that the legal argument of the Administration was not
endorsed by the tenured lawyers in the Solicitor General’s office.
The brief and the footnote sparked a firestorm of controversy, as the Reagan Administration was castigated by the New York Times and other voices of
38
the opposition for supporting “racism.” Given the outcry, it is not surprising
that the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, reaffirmed the policy of
the IRS. The vote was 8-1, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting. The “Bob
Jones team” had suffered a resounding defeat.
The response of the political appointees who had instigated this debacle
was, of course, to blame Wallace. They argued that Wallace, as a holdover
from prior administrations, was hostile to the philosophy of judicial restraint
espoused by the Reagan Administration and was so committed to judicial activism in support of civil rights that he could not be trusted fairly to represent
the views of the Administration to the Court. The upshot was that Wallace was
reassigned to handle matters other than civil rights cases. More significantly,
the Administration created a new position, the Political Deputy, who would
henceforth act in any case in which the Solicitor General was disqualified.
Thus, the perceived political bias of the career attorney was solved by expansion of the number of political appointees in the office.
One could of course draw the opposite lesson from Bob Jones, and conclude
that the episode shows that political lawyers should heed the advice of tenured
lawyers if they want to stay out of trouble. Wallace, on this view, was the legal
“expert” who had an accurate sense of how willing the Court would be to repudiate the IRS’s policy on discriminatory educational institutions. Wallace’s resistance arguably should have been regarded as a warning to the political lawyers that they were embarking on a suicide mission.
Yet the enduring lesson of Bob Jones has not been a restoration of faith in
the judgment of tenured lawyers. Rather, it has been that career lawyers are a
36. Wallace started working in the Solicitor General’s office in 1968 and holds the record for the
most oral arguments before the Court in the Twentieth Century. See Al Kamen, Milestone for Wallace
Today at Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1997, at A17.
37. CAPLAN, supra note 35, at 51.
38. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Ronald Crow, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1982, at B1; Tom Wicker, Subsidizing Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan, 12, 1982, at A15; Tax-Exempt Racism Revisited, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1982, at A22.
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dangerous political fifth column who should be carefully subordinated to politically accountable lawyers. For example, former Solicitor General Charles
Fried, in his reflections on the Bob Jones episode, agrees that the government’s
39
brief was “wrongheaded.” But he also concurs in the assessment that the positions urged by career lawyers in the office were “clogged with commitments
and assumptions that were in fact political,” and he therefore endorses the con40
clusion that a Political Deputy was needed. Significantly, although the Clinton Administration has been less aggressive in subordinating the career lawyers
41
in the Solicitor General’s Office than the Reagan and Bush Administrations,
it has not made any move to abolish the position of the Political Deputy.
Whatever the correct lessons to be drawn from the Bob Jones episode, it is
clear that there are occasions when the policy views of tenured lawyers can create a problem for Presidents. The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
serves as a good illustration. There is no doubt that career lawyers working for
EPA tend to be strongly committed to aggressive enforcement of the environmental laws. This is partly a function of self-selection: Young attorneys who
choose to make a career of service with EPA are typically motivated in part by
their personal attachment to environmental values. It is also partially a function of the close relationship that often develops between career EPA lawyers
and lawyers for environmental groups and congressional staffers who are sympathetic to the environmental cause. Thus, an administration that decides it is
appropriate to adopt a policy that balances environmental protection against
other economic goals is likely to find that these tenured lawyers are, at best,
unenthusiastic about such an accomodationist policy and, at worst, that they ac42
tively work to subvert it. The only solution to such obstruction would appear
to be to increase the level of penetration of political lawyers into the bureaucracy.
39. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 29 (1991).
40. Fried also offers the view that if there had been a Political Deputy in place when the episode
arose “there might even have been some small chance that the Bob Jones brief would never have been
filed.” Id. at 28. Fried suggests, in other words, that a Political Deputy, like the career Deputy, would
have seen the folly of switching sides and supporting Bob Jones—but would have had more credibility
in talking the departmental activists out of doing so. This is possible—the Political Deputies on the
whole have been a very impressive collection of lawyers, and have enjoyed the respect of both political
appointees and career lawyers. But the immediate lesson drawn from Bob Jones was not that a Political Deputy was needed in order to constrain the ill-considered impulses of political appointees, but the
exact opposite: that it was important to make the Office of the Solicitor General more responsive to
the wishes of political appointees.
41. During the Reagan and Bush years, vacancies that occurred within the ranks of the career
Deputies were filled by appointing persons from outside the Office. These were academics or private
practitioners who served fairly short terms of office (three years, typically) and then returned to their
prior walks of life. Arguably, these Deputies (including the author), being relative short-termers, functioned somewhat more like the Political Deputy than the traditional civil service Deputies had done.
The Clinton Justice Department, in contrast, has filled vacancies among the tenured Deputies in the
traditional manner by promoting attorneys from within the Office.
42. See B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Act Enforcements,
82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213 (1988) (finding that EPA bureaucrats continued to bring enforcement actions even after the Reagan Administration installed political appointees hostile to such actions).
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In sum, impartiality appears to be an enfeebled justification for utilizing
tenured lawyers in high-level government positions. The crux of the problem is
a declining faith in law as something that exists and can be discovered independently of political values. If one believes that law cannot be divorced from
politics, then the meaning of law becomes something that should be settled at
the ballot box or through other political processes, not in the law library. If the
meaning of law is to be settled through the ballot box, then what we need are
government lawyers who respect the results of elections, not government lawyers who exercise impartial judgment about the requirements of the law. What
we need, in other words, are more political lawyers in high-level positions.
III
THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL JUSTIFICATION
A second and less commonly encountered justification for the civil service
is based on what I will call the institutional capital argument. This justification
focuses not on the independence of tenured employees, but rather on their longevity in office. Because tenured employees often make government employment a career, they tend to adopt a longer-term perspective than that characteristic of political appointees, who expect to remain in office only for the
duration of one administration (if that). This longer-term perspective of tenured employees translates into certain behaviors that enhance the reputation of
their office in the eyes of other governmental actors, and hence make the office
a more effective instrument for realizing the policy objectives of the incumbent
administration, whatever those objectives may happen to be.
It is well known that political appointees have a very short tenure—about
43
44
two years on average. They are “in-and-outers.” Tenured employees, in
contrast, particularly at the more senior level, often serve in government for
45
their entire careers. This longer-term, multi-administration service gives highlevel tenured lawyers a perspective arguably more attuned to the limits and the
needs of government as an institution. As James Pfiffner has observed:
[P]residential appointees [want] to make their mark quickly and to move on, either to
a higher position in the government or back to the private sector to make more
money. Much of the appointees’ agendas are driven by the mandate to reelect a
president or to leave a good record to run on for the partisan heir-apparent.

43. Pfiffner, supra note 34, at 149.
44. Id.
45. Largely because government salaries have not kept pace with private sector salaries, fewer
tenured lawyers are making a career of government service than was true in an earlier generation.
The consequence is that many civil service lawyers have time horizons not much longer than the typical political lawyer. Two factors offset the effect of this more rapid turnover, however. First, this
short-termism is largely confined to entry-level legal positions. The civil service lawyers promoted to
higher-level positions still tend to be careerists. Second, the culture of the civil service continues to be
shaped and maintained by employees who have a long-term perspective on institutional service, and
entry-level employees tend to assimilate the values instilled by this culture, even if they stay around
only a few years.

MERRILL.FMT

94

12/31/98 12:12 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 61: No. 2

Career executives, in contrast, have a longer-term perspective. They will still be operating programs and administering agencies after the political birds of passage have
left. This causes them to pay attention to the health of institutions and
to the integrity
46
of the processes that assure nonpartisan implementation of the laws.

The longer-term perspective of tenured lawyers suggests that the critical
distinction between political lawyers and tenured lawyers is not so much one of
partisan politics versus neutral expertise, but rather one of different loyalties.
To put the contrast in the broadest possible terms, the political appointee is
loyal to the President, that is, the current incumbent in the office, while the civil
servant is loyal to the presidency, that is, the institution that includes not only
the incumbent but also all past and future Presidents. The fact that their primary loyalty is to the institution rather than the person suggests that tenured
lawyers may perform an important function in building and maintaining the institutional capital of the Executive Branch. If so, then having high-level tenured lawyers may make the Executive Branch a more effective instrument to
the advantage of whoever happens to hold the office of the Presidency at any
given point in time.
There are at least two mutually reinforcing theories that would explain why
tenured lawyers might adopt a longer-term perspective than political lawyers,
and hence why they would be more likely to invest in building and maintaining
47
institutional capital. One is grounded in the economics of human capital.
Employees who have tenure and hence anticipate remaining with their employer for many years will rationally adopt a different strategy for investment
in institution-specific human capital than will employees who anticipate only a
48
short term of service. This is because tenured employees can foresee reaping
the benefits of such investment down the road, whether it be in the form of
greater prestige and power for their office and hence derivatively for themselves, or in terms of fewer hassles in dealing with other institutions, or simply
in terms of learning shortcuts that allow for more leisure time.
The other explanation is provided by game theory. It has been shown that
players in an noncooperative game like the prisoner’s dilemma are less likely to
cooperate when they participate against each other in just one round of the
49
game than if they play multiple rounds against each other. One-shot players
tend to pursue a strategy designed to maximize their immediate individual gain,
whereas repeat players are more apt to pursue a strategy that maximizes payouts over the long-run. This phenomenon has been used to explain a variety of
50
observed behaviors in the law and can be used to explain the behavior of gov46. Id.
47. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d ed. 1975).
48. Cf. Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will,
92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993) (explaining how tenure affects the optimal investment strategy for employees).
49. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 10 (1984).
50. For example, the reluctance of parties to long term contracts to litigate disputes over contractual terms, see Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55 (1963), and the tendency of neighbors to resolve boundary disputes in accordance with
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ernment lawyers as well. Political appointees—the “in-and-outers”—are like
one-shot players who seek immediate payoffs and give relatively little attention
to long-term institution building. Tenured lawyers are like repeat players who
adopt a long-term perspective and hence are more likely to devote themselves
51
to building and maintaining institutional capital.
Institutional capital in this context has several dimensions. One is commonly referred to as “institutional memory.” In any governmental office, history has deposited many layers of past decisions, which leave behind them different degrees of settled practices. As many a short-termer will attest, the
senior civil servants are an invaluable storehouse of this office lore. Practices
followed in the past may or may not be optimal solutions to problems. But
they are usually at least functional solutions, and it is always worth knowing
that they exist before embarking on a different course. The institutional memory of these practices, of which the high-level tenured lawyers are often the sole
repository, has proven invaluable in preventing many a political lawyer and
younger civil service lawyer from reinventing the wheel, and in keeping them
out of trouble.
Another aspect of institutional capital involves the training and mentoring
of young lawyers. One would predict, on average, that tenured lawyers will devote more time and energy to mentoring young lawyers than will political lawyers. This is partly because they have more information to impart, and partly
because they have a larger stake in seeing that younger lawyers learn to perform their jobs properly. Thus, the legal staff serving the President will be better trained if a significant portion of the senior lawyers are tenured than if all
are political appointees.
I would like to concentrate, however, on two other claims about how tenured lawyers function to build and maintain institutional capital that are likely
to be more controversial. The first is that tenured lawyers are more likely to
invest in practices that enhance the reputation of the Executive Branch in the
eyes of other institutional actors. The second is that tenured lawyers are more
likely consistently to defend the prerogatives of the Executive Branch against
encroachments by other institutional actors. In making these claims, I will
draw almost exclusively on illustrations from the Solicitor General’s Office, so
there is necessarily a question about how far my contentions are generalizable
across the entire range of government offices.
A. Reputation Building
The Solicitor General’s Office provides some especially good illustrations
of how tenured lawyers work to build and maintain the reputation of the Exinformal norms, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
51. The distinction drawn here in terms of game theory is similar to that developed by Marc Galanter between “one-shot” and “repeat” litigants, used explain litigant behavior. See Marc S. Galanter,
Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95
(1974).
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ecutive Branch with other institutional actors. It is a commonplace that the
Solicitor General’s behavior as a litigant deviates in several significant ways
52
from that of every other litigant who appears before the Supreme Court. Perhaps most importantly, the Solicitor General exercises extreme self-restraint in
selecting cases to present to the Court for review: Only a small portion of the
cases that the government loses in the courts of appeals become petitions for
certiorari. Moreover, the Solicitor General is especially scrupulous to draw the
Court’s attention to facts and precedents adverse to the government’s posi53
tion. This affirmative disclosure policy benefits the Court by giving it a more
accurate picture of the legal dimensions of the case, but would seem to increase
the odds of the government losing in any particular case where such a disclosure is made. In addition, the Solicitor General, unlike most other litigants, will
occasionally acquiesce in another party’s petition for certiorari, even if this puts
at risk a favorable judgment obtained in the lower courts. Finally, and most
strikingly, the Solicitor General in a very few cases each Term “confesses error,” and asks the Court to reverse and remand a favorable judgment obtained
by the government in the lower courts because it is based on an error of law or
54
fact or is contrary to Justice Department policy. Needless to say, no other litigant asks the Court to rule against it.
These behaviors have been cited by commentators for the proposition that
the Solicitor General has divided loyalties. Some commentators claim that the
Solicitor General owes a duty of loyalty both to the Executive Branch and di55
rectly to the Court—hence the moniker the “Tenth Justice.” Others argue
more vaguely that the Solicitor General must represent the interests not just of
56
the Executive Branch but of the entire “United States,” or that the Solicitor

52. See generally REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW
(1992); CAPLAN, supra note 35.
53. General rules of legal ethics require that lawyers “disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel.” MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983).
Lawyers in a private practice, with the acquiescence of courts, often interpret this duty narrowly. See
Risa B. Lischkoff, Recent Decisions on Citing Authorities to Courts: Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 315, 319 (1994). Lawyers in the Solicitor General’s
office, in my experience, uniformly adopt a generous interpretation of the duty.
54. See generally David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the
Solicitor General, 82 GEO L.J. 2079 (1994). Confession of error in the sense of disclaiming a favorable
judgment on grounds of miscarriage of justice should be distinguished from cases where the Solicitor
General refuses to defend a duly-enacted federal statute on the ground that he concludes it is unconstitutional. Usually this happens when the Solicitor General concludes that the statute interferes with
executive branch prerogatives. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659 (1988) (Solicitor General Fried argues for United States against the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act). But occasionally a Solicitor General will decline to enforce a statute on the ground that it has no plausible defense under established principles of constitutional law.
This has happened, for example, with respect to gender discriminations found in Social Security laws.
See Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 872, 873 n.2 (1984).
55. CAPLAN, supra note 35.
56. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General—Representing the Interests of
the United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 MO. L. REV. 527, 533 (1969).
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General has a special duty to uphold and enforce “the law” (this being an especially quaint pre-Bork notion).
It is not necessary, however, to adopt any of these theories of divided loyalty in order to explain the Solicitor General’s unique litigating behavior. Each
of the cited anomalies—the self-restraint in seeking certiorari, the affirmative
disclosure of adverse authority, acquiescence in review, and confession of error—are behaviors that enhance the Solicitor General’s reputation with the
Justices for being an “honest broker” or a “straight shooter.” Having such a
reputation undoubtedly increases the degree of overall deference that the
Court gives the Solicitor General, as reflected in the government’s very high
58
overall win rates in the Court. It also increases the probability that the Court
will defer to the wishes of the Solicitor General in special circumstances where
it is especially vital to the incumbent Administration that the Court grant review or issue a stay in a given case.
The advantages that come from having a reputation for good faith and honesty have not been lost on the more thoughtful lawyers who have served as Solicitor General. Shortly after he left office Rex Lee observed:
There has been built up, over 115 years since this office was first created in 1870, a
reservoir of credibility on which the incumbent Solicitor General may draw to his immediate adversarial advantage. But if he draws too deeply, too greedily, or too indiscriminately, then he jeopardizes not only that
advantage in that particular case, but
59
also an important institution of government.

What has not been noted, to my knowledge, is the connection between
these reputation-building behaviors and the prevalence of tenured lawyers in
the Office. Virtually every exercise of self-abnegating behavior originates with
the civil service appointees—the Assistants to the Solicitor General or the career deputies. The most vivid example is provided by confessions of error. It
almost never happens that a recommendation to confess error comes from one
of the litigating divisions, such as the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. The lawyers who tried and won the case in the lower courts are never
eager to undo their own success. And only rarely does the initiative for confessing error come either from the Solicitor General or from the Political Dep-

57. See Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General: The Role of the Solicitor General 1 OP.
OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 228, 231-32 (1977).
58. Empirical studies show that the Solicitor General succeeds in getting certiorari granted 70% of
the time (compared to about eight percent for other litigants); prevails on the merits about 67% of the
time; and supports the winning side with amicus curiae briefs about 75% of the time. See Jeffrey A.
Segal, Supreme Court Support for the Solicitor General: The Effect of Presidential Appointments, 43 W.
POL. Q. 137, 139-40 (1990); see also Steven Puro, The United States as Amicus Curiae, in COURTS,
LAW AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES 220 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., 1981); Reginald S. Sheehan et al., Ideology,
Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
464, 465 (1992).
59. Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
595, 601 (1986); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General,
21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105 (1988).
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uty. Both are usually too busy with higher profile matters to dig into the record
60
in the way required to initiate the process of considering a confession of error.
What happens in most cases resulting in a confession of error is as follows.
The case arrives in the Office, usually in the form of a draft opposition to a petition for certiorari prepared by the litigating division, and is assigned to a tenured Assistant. The Assistant studies the draft opposition in light of decision
and the record below, and discovers what appears to be a miscarriage of law or
justice. The Assistant then recommends to the relevant Deputy that the government file a confession of error rather than an opposition. The Deputy
(typically also a tenured lawyer), will scrutinize such a recommendation skeptically, recognizing that the litigating division will strongly object to any confession of error. But if the Assistant convinces the Deputy that a miscarriage of
justice has truly occurred, the Deputy will then take the matter to the Solicitor
General. Often a vigorous discussion tantamount to an oral argument then
takes place between the tenured lawyers in the Solicitor General’s office and
the lawyers in the litigating division, with the Solicitor General acting as
“judge.” If the tenured lawyers in the Solicitor General’s office convince the
Solicitor General they are right, then the government confesses error.
It is difficult to imagine this process occurring very often if all lawyers in the
Solicitor General’s office were political appointees. A confession of error always generates short-term costs in the form of hard feelings within the Department. The ability to incur these short-term costs is made possible primarily
because the tenured Deputy who concurs in the Assistant’s recommendation
(nearly always the Deputy who handles criminal cases) has built up a large
store house of good will with his or her counterpart in the litigating division.
The top-level civil service lawyers in the litigating division respect and trust the

60. A recent exception to this generalization underscores the perils that arise when inexperienced
political lawyers overrule the career lawyers and insist on an abrupt change in position in the middle of
a case. Near the beginning of his service as President Clinton’s first Solicitor General, Drew Days filed
a confession of error in a brief on the merits in Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993), a child pornography conviction. Although the career lawyers in the Bush Administration had argued that the
conviction should be upheld, Days—reportedly at the urging of his new Political Deputy Paul
Bender—argued that the lower courts had applied an improperly broad interpretation of the statute.
See Joan Biskupic, Politics Still Plays a Role in Solicitor General’s Office, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1994,
at A1. According to the new Solicitor General’s position, free speech considerations required that the
“lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area” of children be interpreted to mean exhibitions in
which the genital areas are fully exposed. In the films produced by Knox, by contrast, young girls were
shown cavorting in tight bathing suits, leotards, or underpants. See Brief for the United States, at 1013, 20-23, Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993) (No. 92-1183). Upon receiving this confession or
error, the Court vacated and remanded the conviction for reconsideration by the lower court.
Days’ action was undoubtedly motivated by sincere concerns about free speech values. But it
proved to be deeply embarrassing to the Clinton Administration. Republicans had a field day suggesting that the Administration favored coddling child pornographers, and secured a unanimous resolution in the Senate condemning the new interpretation. See Biskupic, supra note 26. When, on remand, the Third Circuit rejected the new interpretation and reaffirmed Knox’s conviction, Attorney
General Reno took the highly unusual step of publicly repudiating the Solicitor General’s prior position, and signing the opposition to certiorari herself. See David G. Savage & Ronald J. Ostrow, U.S.
Won’t Fight Pornography Conviction, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at A34. The Court then denied certiorari without comment. See Knox v. United States, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995).
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judgment of the tenured Deputy and know that the Deputy is acting with the
best long-run interests of the litigating division in mind. If everyone involved
were a political appointee, this basis of trust grounded in long-term interaction
would be missing, and the short-term political costs would loom much larger.
A similar if less dramatic story can be told with respect to the other selfabnegating behaviors of the Solicitor General’s office: self restraint in seeking
certiorari, affirmative disclosure of adverse facts and authority, and acquiescence in opponents’ petitions for certiorari. The tenured lawyers are the key
participants in producing each of these behaviors. The functional consequence
of using tenured lawyers, therefore, is that the government adopts litigating behaviors that translate into short-term setbacks or reversals (unusually in insignificant cases), but the government emerges with an immensely enhanced reputation for honesty and good faith that translates into powerful litigating
advantages overall.
B. Defense of Prerogatives
The connection between tenured lawyers and defense of executive branch
prerogatives is less apparent than that with respect to reputation-building.
Nevertheless, I believe there is a connection here too. Many readers will find
such a claim to be highly counter-intuitive. The common assumption is that
only political appointees can be trusted vigorously to defend the prerogatives of
the President, whereas tenured lawyers will be quick to seek accommodation or
compromise with the other branches. Yet for reasons analogous to those regarding long-term reputation-building, it may be that tenured lawyers are in
fact more likely to be steadfast in the defense of the presidency than political
appointees will be.
The difficulty of using political lawyers to defend executive branch preroga61
tives has been acutely analyzed in an important article by Nelson Lund. Lund
describes how President Bush made a conscious decision at the outset of his
Administration to use the lawyers in the White House Counsel’s Office and the
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) in the Justice Department vigorously to defend the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive Branch, which Bush regarded as being under assault by Congress and the courts. To this end, a plan
was devised that included a much more aggressive use of the veto, presidential
signing statements, and litigation in an effort to fend off encroachments on
presidential powers.
As Lund describes it, the net result of this campaign was largely a disaster.
Over the course of the next four years, the veto was used only rarely and
62
mostly for minor encroachments; warnings delivered in signing statements
63
were not followed up with action; the Administration ended up defending in

61. See generally Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17.
62. See id. at 40-43, 63-64.
63. See id.
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court the most serious encroachments on the President’s authority; and the
separation-of-powers team precipitated a judicial confrontation over the independence of the Post Office that backfired badly and ended up eroding presi65
dential prerogatives.
Lund’s explanation for this dismal record is in effect that political lawyers
are too preoccupied with short-term consequences to engage in long-term institution building. He notes that the rewards for defending presidential prerogatives
would mostly be reaped at some remote period of time, after the defenders of the
theory had left office. The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing purposes, the
unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies, and
the sheer
expenditure of time by extremely busy people on uninvitingly dry legal is66
sues.

In short, political lawyers cannot be expected to make significant investments in long-term defense of the presidency for the same reason that tenants
holding year-to-year leases cannot be expected to make significant improvements in land: The costs would be fully internalized by the improver while the
benefits would largely be externalized to someone else.
If Lund’s diagnosis of the problem is correct, then this suggests that tenured
lawyers may again be part of the solution. My own experience in the government suggests that there are at least some occasions when tenured lawyers will
weigh in more vigorously to support executive prerogative than political lawyers. Of course, they will not often (or even usually) prevail. Controversies
that implicate the defense of presidential prerogatives—in contrast to those
that lead to confessions of error, acquiescences, and the like—are often highprofile disputes that attract the close attention of the political lawyers and even
cabinet officers and the President. Consequently, the tenured lawyers are more
likely to be overruled in cases involving defense of presidential prerogatives.
Nevertheless, I believe that the input of the tenured lawyers in these controversies may have a salutary influence in keeping the longer-range issues in the
forefront of the discussion.
An illustration of this phenomenon occurred during my tenure in the Solicitor General’s office in the late 1980s. It involved what is usually the most routine task performed by the Solicitor General’s office: authorizing an appeal
from a federal district court to the court of appeals. In such matters, the recommendation of the staff is nearly always accepted by the Solicitor General. In
very rare cases, the Solicitor General’s decision will be challenged by a disappointed Department or agency, in which case it may be resolved by the Deputy
Attorney General or even the Attorney General. In this particular case, the
64. See id. at 70-79.
65. See id. at 79-83; see also Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: Reflections on the Bush White
House’s Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1035 (1994).
66. Lund, supra note 61, at 35.
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Solicitor General’s decision in favor of an appeal was challenged by the State
Department all the way to the desk of President Ronald Reagan.
The case involved an appropriations rider called the “Anti-Terrorism Act
of 1987,” which in unequivocal terms required that the Palestine Liberation
67
Organization’s (“PLO’s”) observer-mission to the United Nations be closed.
After President Reagan signed the Act into law, the Civil Division of the Justice Department dutifully filed suit in federal court in the Southern District of
New York seeking an injunction closing the mission. Nothwithstanding the un68
ambiguous legislative mandate, Judge Palmieri denied the requested relief.
Judge Palmieri reasoned that the PLO had a customary right to maintain the
69
observer-mission under the United Nations Headquarters Agreement, an international treaty ratified by the United States, and that Congress could not
pass a law abrogating a provision in an international treaty unless the statute
70
expressly acknowledged the conflict with international law.
The Civil Division recommended that this decision be appealed to the Second Circuit. In the Division’s view, the Headquarters Agreement did not establish the PLO’s right to maintain an observer-mission, and even if it had,
there is no requirement that Congress expressly acknowledge it is abrogating a
treaty provision before unambiguous legislation inconsistent with a treaty will
be given effect. The State Department opposed an appeal. The Department
placed primary reliance on the damage to U.S. foreign relations that would be
ensue if the U.S., as the host nation to the United Nations, unilaterally expelled
a foreign entity to which the United Nations had granted observer status.
It was in this posture that the matter arrived in the Solicitor General’s Office. What was odd about the appeal request, from the perspective of the tenured lawyers in the Solicitor General’s Office, was that the papers gave no consideration to the constitutional concerns raised by a congressional enactment
directing the President to shut down a diplomatic mission in the United States.
Under the Constitution, the President is given the power to “receive Ambassa71
dors and other public Ministers,” and this has been understood to give the
President broad and exclusive power to determine what sort of diplomatic
72
agents may enter the country. The Anti-Terrorism Act appeared to usurp this
67. 22 U.S.C. § 5202 (1994). The Act, which is still on the books, makes it unlawful:
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United
States at the behest of or direction of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents
thereof.
Id. The Attorney General is directed to “take the necessary steps and institute the necessary legal action to effectuate the policies and provisions of this chapter.” Id. at § 5203(a).
68. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
69. See id. at 1465-68.
70. See id. at 1468-71.
71. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
72. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) (noting in dictum that
President has exclusive authority to recognize foreign governments); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204 (1987).
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function insofar as agents of the PLO were concerned. Yet the political lawyers in the Civil Division gave no weight to the adverse precedent that would
be created for future claims of presidential control over diplomacy by prominently seeking an appellate decision vindicating a congressional directive to
close a diplomatic mission. The precedent was especially problematic given
that the State Department seemed to be saying that closure of the PLO mission
was contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.
In fact, from the time the Anti-Terrorism Act was passed, it was primarily
the tenured lawyers within the Justice Department who gave voice to the constitutional concerns presented by the Act. Staff lawyers in the Office of Legal
Counsel raised the constitutional issue immediately after the Act was passed.
This resulted in some cautionary language being included in President Reagan’s signing statement, but did not dissuade the Civil Division from seeking an
injunction enforcing the Act. When the Civil Division sought authority to appeal Judge Palmieri’s decision, staff lawyers in the Solicitor General’s office
raised the issue once again. This time the issue did not go away. Solicitor General Fried eventually authorized an appeal, but added the significant qualification that an such appeal could be forgone if the President was willing to state
that enforcement of the Anti-Terrorism would be unconstitutional as applied to
73
the PLO mission—a step that would require formal notification of Congress.
Heartened by Fried’s equivocation, the State Department asked the Attorney General to overrule the appeal authorization. The Attorney General declined. Secretary of State George Shultz then took the matter to the Presi74
dent. The day the notice of appeal was due to be filed, President Reagan
75
overruled the Attorney General and Fried, and decided against an appeal.
The President did not state, as Fried had thought was required, that he was invoking his Article II authority to disregard a statute that violated presidential
prerogatives. Thus, this was hardly the finest hour for the bold defense of the
presidency. Essentially, the President was hiding behind the legal reasoning of
Judge Palimieri, which every senior lawyer in the Justice Department regarded
as untenable.
On the other hand, the decision not to appeal avoided creating a stronger
precedent that would legitimize congressional efforts to interfere with diplomatic missions that the President did not wish to close. For this, the tenured
lawyers in the Justice Department may deserve some small credit. Their articulation of the constitutional objections to an appeal provided a legal argu73. Each year, in its annual appropriation of funds for the Justice Department, Congress requires
the Attorney General to notify both Houses of Congress whenever the Attorney General concludes in
a contested case that a statute of the United States cannot be defended on constitutional grounds. See
28 U.S.C. § 519 ( 1994) (note).
74. See Robert Pear, U.S. Officials Split over Whether to Appeal Ruling on P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 1988, at A5.
75. See John M. Goshko, PLO Mission to Stay Open; U.S. Won’t Appeal Ruling; Decision Based
on Foreign Policy Considerations, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1988, at A2; Norman Kempster, U.S. Drops
Effort to Oust PLO’s U.N. Mission in N.Y., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, § 1 at 1; Robert Pear, U.S. Will
Allow P.L.O. to Maintain Its Office at U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, A1.
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ment lending credibility to the State Department’s purely prudential concerns.
I have no idea what weight, if any, the President and his advisers gave to the
constitutional implications of an appeal. It is possible that they were a factor in
the discussions, which is more than could be said of the situation when the request for authority to appeal first emerged from the front office of the Civil Division.
Why might tenured lawyers be more concerned with preserving the President’s constitutional prerogatives than political lawyers? On the face of the
matter, it appears mysterious. Yet the political reality that unlocks the mystery
was in fact reasonably clear to everyone involved in the internal discussions.
The political lawyers were responding to the same forces that had energized the
members of Congress who had voted for the Anti-Terrorism Act, namely, that
there was more political support to be garnered by taking a hard line against
the PLO.
Specifically, the America-Israel Political Action Committee
(“AIPAC”) was at that time on a crusade to get the United States to isolate the
PLO diplomatically and had made closure of the United Nations mission its top
76
priority. Ambitious political animals in Washington had good reason to want
to stay on the good side of AIPAC, which had enough influence to be able to
77
advance or thwart future political careers.
The tenured-lawyers, in contrast, could care less what AIPAC thought
about the PLO. Their perspective was institutional. They were concerned that
a high-visibility appeal seeking to enforce the statute would create an important precedent ratifying Congress’s intrusion into presidential diplomacy.
Given their independence from short-term political considerations, they had
greater incentive to stand up for the President’s constitutional powers than the
political lawyers did.
The moral of this story is obviously not that tenured lawyers will always
protect presidential prerogatives. Presidential prerogatives will often be challenged in cases, like the closure of the PLO mission, with high political stakes,
and the political lawyers will have the last word in such cases. It does not follow from this, however, that tenured lawyers exert no influence in support of
presidential prerogatives. It was my experience that tenured lawyers are highly
sensitive to the need to protect presidential prerogatives. After all, this is the
ultimate source of their own authority and prestige. And it was my experience
that tenured lawyers are often far more steadfast in their support of these prerogatives than are the “in-and-outers.” So, although the use of tenured lawyers
cannot guarantee the defense of presidential prerogatives, it nevertheless
makes a positive contribution toward that end.

76. See E.A. Wayne, U.S. Searches for a Way Around Law That Will Close PLO Office, CHRIST.
SCI. MON., Jan. 13, 1988, at 5; Ending an Embarrassment, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1988, at 6.
77. John Bolton, who was the head of the Civil Division at the time, had ambitions to secure a
high-level diplomatic post. He was later was nominated and confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State
in the Bush Administration.
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C. Institutional Capital in the Balance
I have suggested that tenured lawyers contribute to the institutional capital
of the Executive Branch in a variety of ways. They provide a source of institutional memory, and are more likely to mentor young lawyers. More controversially, they may be more likely to engage in behaviors that enhance the reputation of the Executive Branch in the eyes of other institutional actors and may
be more stalwart in their defense of executive branch prerogatives than are political lawyers. These justifications for tenured lawyers strike me as more powerful than the impartiality justification, at least in an era that has suffered a loss
of faith in the ability of lawyers to discover the law independent of political
considerations.
To say that there is a justification for having tenured lawyers does not, however, mean that every lawyer who serves in the government should be tenured.
Political lawyers, who are much more sensitive to the policy preferences of
elected officials, introduce an important element of democratic accountability
that would be missing if all lawyers were life-long civil servants. And any system of tenure creates inefficiencies in the form of the increased opportunities
for shirking. The point, rather, is that there is an optimal mix of political lawyers and tenured lawyers. If we focus only on the impartiality justification, it
might seem that the optimal mix would call for an expansion of the ranks of
political lawyers, because this ensures greater political accountability and efficiency, and no one puts much stock in impartiality these days. However, once
we introduce the contributions that tenured lawyers make toward building and
maintaining institutional capital, including the reputation of the Executive
Branch and defending executive branch prerogatives, then the optimal mix appears to shift back in the direction of using relatively more tenured lawyers.
IV
REPLACING THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL WITH TENURED LAWYERS
I will close with some observations about how the foregoing framework applies to what is undoubtedly the most controversial issue of our time regarding
the role of government lawyers: the investigation and prosecution of alleged
criminal activity by high-level executive branch officials.
The current system for handling this problem is set forth in the Ethics in
78
Government Act. The Act is a product of post-Watergate suspicion of all
things governmental. It calls for the appointment of Independent Counsels
who operate outside the supervision of the Justice Department. If the Attorney General receives an allegation of possible criminal activity by a high-level
executive official, the Attorney General must seek the appointment of an Independent Counsel if there are “reasonable grounds to believe that further in78. 28 U.S.C. § 591-599 (1994). For an overview of the Act’s current provisions, see John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 MERCER L. REV. 519 (1998).
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vestigation is warranted.” The actual appointment of the Independent Counsel is made by a special panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, which also defines the Independent Counsel’s ju80
risdiction. Once appointed, the Independent Counsel can be dismissed by the
Attorney General only “for good cause,” in which case the dismissal is subject
81
to judicial review. Otherwise, the special panel determines when the Independent Counsel’s investigation is over.
82
To say that this system has worked badly is a considerable understatement.
Without suggesting that every investigation shares all these shortcomings, there
is a general consensus that the current system results in the following problems,
83
among others: too many criminal investigations of top executive officials;
criminal investigations into alleged misdeeds that would ordinarily be regarded
as too trivial to warrant prosecution; investigations that drag on for an inordinate length of time; extraordinarily expensive investigations running into tens
of millions of dollars; routine charges that the investigators are politically motivated and countercharges that investigated are engaged in obstruction of justice; the erosion of norms surrounding the confidentiality of grand jury investigations; and a general poisoning of the Washington political climate caused by
the criminalization of ordinary political disagreements.
How could such a well-intentioned statute produce such an unfortunate set
of results? The one problem would seem to be that the Act single-mindedly
pursues the goal of impartiality at the expense of all accountability. As suggested earlier, in structuring the duties of high-level government lawyers, there
is always a tradeoff between impartiality and accountability. The more independent the lawyer, the less accountable. Sacrificing all accountability in this
context would make sense only if in doing so we could obtain true impartiality.
But the function of investigating criminal accusations directed at high-level
politicians is not an activity that is susceptible to objectively determinable, politically neutral, right answers. Alleged crimes like perjury or obstruction of
justice—the usual grist for the independent counsel mill—will always entail a
subjective element, in which prosecutorial judgment must be exercised in deciding whether charges should be brought. Thus, the Act’s quest for the completely independent lawyer to decide whether to bring criminal charges against
high-ranking executive officials is fundamentally misconceived.

See id. § 592(c)(1)(A).
See id. § 593(b)(3).
See id. § 596(a)(1), (3).
For earlier reviews of the problems created by the Act, see TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS,
POLITICS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 121-135 (1989); KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT
JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 117-167 (1992). More recently, even erstwhile ardent supporters have expressed their doubts. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Curbing Special Counsels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at A37.
83. See Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the Past Informs
the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489, 515 (1998) (“Before 1978 there were three scandals
deemed worthy of independent investigation. Since the passage of the Act, there have been nineteen
with the campaign finance issue left to be resolved.”).
79.
80.
81.
82.
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We have also learned by now—or should have learned by now—that making the Independent Counsel completely unaccountable actually weakens the
institution. There was a taste of this with Lawrence Walsh’s investigation of
the Iran-Contra affair, as Republicans lashed out at Walsh for conducting a biased investigation designed to influence the 1992 elections, and Walsh never
seemed fully to regain his public standing. But the Clinton White House's
strategy for attacking Kenneth Starr’s investigations have fully revealed the
fallacy of relying on a totally independent prosecutor. Starr has been subjected
to a relentless White House attack on his motives and methods. Because he
has no electoral mandate, these attacks have been highly successful. A high
percentage of the public evidently regards Starr’s investigation as the product
of a “right-wing conspiracy” bent on upsetting the results of a national election.
A prosecutor who is accountable to elected public officials would be less vulnerable to this kind of campaign.
Exactly how accountable we should make the lawyers that investigate allegations of high-level executive crimes is a more difficult question. It would
make no sense to make such lawyers immediately accountable to the President,
by, for example, putting the investigative function in the White House Counsel’s office. This would assure that no politically embarrassing criminal activity
would ever come to light. On the other hand, it is important that those who
control “perhaps the most potent weapon the government can wield against a
private citizen—the power to bring criminal charges” should be answerable, at
84
least indirectly, to elected public officials. The proper solution would seem to
require some compromise between independence and accountability.
What is less recognized is that the Ethics in Government Act, in its pursuit
of extreme independence, creates a second problem: It ignores the importance
of the values that I have associated with the institutional capital justification for
tenured lawyers. This was perceived many years ago in a commentary written
by two former Deputy Solicitor Generals, Andy Frey and Ken Geller. Nothing
that has transpired in recent years undermines the wisdom of their perceptions:
Because each independent counsel is appointed on an ad hoc basis for the limited
purpose of investigating specific allegations against one individual or a small group of
individuals, his decisions are made without resort to any institutional memory and
without the ability (or the need) to place a case within the broader framework that
has evolved in the course of exercising prosecutorial discretion in large numbers of
cases. . . .
A seasoned federal prosecutor in the handling of numerous criminal cases acquires a
sense of perspective, fairness[,] and judgment, which a one-shot prosecutor necessarily lacks. . . . [T]he objective of the exercise should be to apply the normal standards
of investigation and prosecution evenhandedly to those in high government circles
(taking into account that it may be appropriate to hold such individuals to a somewhat higher standard of conduct), not to loose on them some avenging
angel free
85
from traditional constraints on the exercise of the prosecutive power.

84. See Andrew L. Frey & Kenneth S. Geller, Better Than Independent Counsels, WASH. POST,
Feb. 14, 1988, at C7.
85. Id.
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In other words, the Independent Counsel is an “in-and-outer.” He or she
has little or no incentive to abide by Justice Department policies, to adhere to
traditional prosecutorial norms that have evolved over time, to conserve resources, to wrap-up business expeditiously, or to preserve principles like the
confidentiality of grand jury proceedings.
In effect then, the Ethics in Government Act manages to combine the worst
features of political lawyers and tenured lawyers. It creates an office that lacks
political accountability and is prone to inefficiencies—the problems associated
with tenured lawyers. Yet it also creates an office having the short time horizons and lack of institutional memory associated with political lawyers. No
wonder the Act has been such a disaster for our polity.
Since the Act gives us the worst of all possible worlds, there are many ways
to improve it, including outright repeal. One suggestion that merits further
consideration would be to confer the function of investigating executive crimes
upon an office of high-level tenured lawyers in the Justice Department.
This is not the time and place to spell out the details of how such an office
might be organized. The general idea would be to create an office of career
prosecutors within the Criminal Division of the Justice Department who would
devote themselves full-time to the investigation of allegations of high-level
criminal activity by elected politicians. All lawyers in this office would be tenured civil servants, and all would be required to log a certain minimum number
of years as line prosecutors, ideally spanning multiple administrations, before
they would be appointed to the special office. They would be the quintessential
“lifers”—professional prosecutors thoroughly imbued with the norms of their
trade and having no aspirations for private employment or political advancement.
I see no constitutional reason why the head of this office could not also be a
86
tenured lawyer. When Frey and Geller made a similar proposal in 1988, they
assumed that such an office would have to be headed by a presidential ap87
pointee. But this was before the Supreme Court, in Morrison v. Olson, rejected the Appointments Clause and other serious constitutional challenges
mounted against the independent counsel idea. If an Independent Counsel appointed by an Article III court is constitutional, then an office of public investigations headed by a tenured Justice Department lawyer is constitutional. Certainly, there would be no constitutional problem presented in having such an
office headed by a tenured lawyer, as long as the Attorney General (or some
other accountable official) could reassign the particular tenured lawyer serving
as the head of the office and replace them with another tenured lawyer.

86. Making the head of this office both tenured and permanent would run the risk of creating another J. Edgar Hoover, who could collect embarrassing information about elected politicians and use it
to build an independent political empire. Thus, some type of rotation or term limits for the head of the
office—who would nevertheless retain his or her tenure rights to continued employment elsewhere in
the government—might be desirable.
87. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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The basic point is that high-level tenured lawyers can serve important and
useful purposes, and one of them may be getting us out of the independent
88
counsel mess. What is needed is an investigative office that strikes the right
balance between accountability and independence, has significant accumulated
experience in reviewing multiple cases of alleged political corruption, is populated with individuals who have no aspirations for higher office, knows how to
function under a fixed budget, and will aspire to build a reputation for the
highest standards of integrity. The time-tested device for achieving these sorts
of objectives is to staff the office heavily with high-level tenured lawyers. Like
other human contrivances, tenured lawyers are not perfect. But they have
some important strengths, and those strengths are sorely needed if we are to
escape from the dysfunctions created by the Ethics in Government Act.
V
CONCLUSION
Debates over the future of the civil service are usually couched in terms of a
trade-off between accountability and impartiality. If that were all at stake, I
would tend to take the accountability side, at least insofar as government lawyers are concerned. To put the matter in the larger framework so ably developed by my colleague Steve Calabresi in this symposium, government lawyers
must serve as “advocates” and “ambassadors” for the incumbent Administration’s political/legal viewpoints, and these roles surely require a strong dose of
89
accountability—stronger than one ever gets from tenured lawyers.
I have argued, however, that there should be another dimension to the debate: what might be called the trade-off between transience and stability. Highlevel tenured lawyers bring a long-term perspective to legal problems that is
lacking in political lawyers. This long-term perspective generates various forms
of institutional capital associated with the values of predictability, consistency,
protection of reliance interests, and respect for tradition.
These values are especially important in matters of government. Government ultimately rests on coercion. With the threat of coercion in the background, legal arguments will be more persuasive if they are leavened with a
healthy respect for continuity with the past. Thus, political lawyers will perform more effectively if they are backstopped by high-level tenured lawyers,
who bring with them a natural tendency to promote continuity. This enhanced
effectiveness applies, moreover, regardless of which function political lawyers
are asked to perform—including advocating the President’s constitutional vision.

88. Cf. Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988)
(addressing primarily the mess in constitutional law created by the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the independent counsel statute, but also the mess it has created for our political system).
89. Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution: A Brief Positive
Account of the Role of Government Lawyers in the Development of Constitutional Law, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (Winter 1998).

